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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
MANDATORY PUBLIC SCHOOL
COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAMS
RODNEY A. SMOLLA*
I
INTRODUCTION
Proposals for public service programs have long had currency in America,
and may be gaining a certain millennium momentum in current public debate.
While proposals for national public service programs of varying ambition and
scope continue to be debated,1 at the local level a growing number of U.S.
public school districts are implementing community service programs for high
school students.2 Community service programs generally require students to
complete a specified number of hours of service as a condition for graduation.3
In a typical program, a student may be required to complete forty to sixty hours
Copyright © 2000 by Rodney A. Smolla
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* George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See generally Doug Bandow, National Service—or Government Service?, POL’Y REV., Sept.Oct. 1996, at 33-36; Harris Wofford et al., Americorps the Beautiful? Americorps Nat’l Service Program,
POL’Y REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 28-32.
2. See generally RONALD T. HYMAN, MANDATORY COMMUNITY SERVICE IN HIGH SCHOOL:
THE LEGAL DIMENSION (1999); NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
COMMUNITY SERVICE ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING HIGH SCHOOL (1998); Mark Ferraraccio, Mandatory
Community Service Requirements in Public High Schools: Are They Constitutional?, 27 J.L. & EDUC.
139 (1998); Stephen G. Giles, Liberal Parentalism and Children’s Educational Rights, 26 CAP. U. L.
REV. 9 (1997); Richard Kraft, Service Learning: An Introduction to Its Theory, Practice, and Effects, 28
EDUC. & URBAN SOC’Y 131, 136-37 (1996); Bradley H. Kreshek, Students or Serfs? Is Mandatory
Community Service a Violation of the Thirteenth Amendment?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809 (1997);
Michael Wessely, Learning to Serve?, 27 UPDATING SCH. BD. POL’Y, Aug. 1996, at 1; Daniel Stefaniuk,
Note, No Service, No Diploma: Parental Rights Challenge to Mandatory Community Service in
Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 149 (1997); John Cloud, Involuntary
Volunteers, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 76; Kevin Johnson, Schools Force Students to Learn Value of Service,
USA TODAY, May 4, 1998, at 6D; Linda Perlstein, “Serving” the Community—Without Leaving School,
WASH. POST, June 28, 1999, at A1.
3. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel-Hill Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 176-77 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997). In Herndon, the school system in Chapel Hill-Carrboro,
North Carolina required students to complete 50 hours of community service during grades nine
through twelve as a condition to receiving a diploma. The failure to complete the requirements
rendered a student ineligible for graduation. No opt-out provision for students existed for those
objecting to the performance of the community service. The community service required by the
program had to be performed after school, on weekends or holidays, or over summer recesses.
Students were required to perform a minimum of two different types of service—clerical and
fundraising—each limited to eight hours each week. A school official maintained a list of approved
agencies and organizations for whom students could work to satisfy the requirements. This extensive
list included agencies and organizations with many different missions and philosophies.
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of community service with organizations or agencies on an approved
community service list during their high school years. There are often modest
academic or introspective components to a community service program, such as
a requirement that a student compose a paper reporting or reflecting upon his
or her community service.4
As with all innovations in U.S. public life, such programs are inevitably
challenged in the courts. At first blush, the challenges appear plausible: These
programs are forced labor of sorts, an oxymoronic coerced volunteerism, the
imposition of a particular philosophic vision of civic duty and community life on
the whole student populace, and the cry that this just can’t be constitutional is at
least colorably serious.
Constitutional challenges to community service programs may be divided
into two generic types—those raised by students or parents who object to the
requirement of community service, and those raised by students, parents,
organizations, or agencies who object to the selection criteria used to include or
exclude organizations or agencies eligible to participate in community service
programs. The first form of challenge will involve someone who claims to be a
“conscientious objector” to compelled community service. The objection may
be broadly articulated, contesting the entire idea of coerced community service,
or it may be more narrowly conceived, claiming that for reasons unique to a
certain student, participation in a community service program of a particular
design violates the student’s constitutional rights. Broad objections are likely to
be grounded in the claim that community service is a form of involuntary
servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, or a deprivation of the
students’ or parents’ liberty protected under the substantive due process
principles that have evolved from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. More targeted challenges are likely to be grounded in First
Amendment arguments, such as claims that for a particular student,
participation in a community service program violates the student’s rights of
freedom of association, freedom against forced speech, or the free exercise of
religion.
Challenges to the selection criteria used to determine which groups are
eligible for participation in community service programs may attack either a
decision to keep a particular organization on or off of the “approved list” of
participants, or a decision to include an organization or agency on the list.
Thus, a service program operated by a local church might be excluded by a
school board from participation on the ground that inclusion would violate
principles of separation of church and state. The church might sue the school
board, claiming that the exclusion of the church service program, when other
similar programs run by secular organizations are not excluded, violates the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Or, imagine that a local chapter
4. See, e.g., id. at 177 (discussing a program that required a student to prepare a paper reflecting
on “memories or special feelings” gained from each service experience, and a final paper reflecting on
the student’s overall service experiences).
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of the Ku Klux Klan creates what purports to be a community service program,
and a school board refuses to include the program, on the ground that the
Klan’s racist agenda renders it inappropriate for participation in any joint
venture with public schools. The Klan might sue to challenge its exclusion,
arguing that such ideology-based decisionmaking by the school board amounts
to viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. Conversely, students, parents, taxpayers, or a local chapter of the
American Civil Liberties Union might bring suit to challenge the inclusion of
some organization or agency on an approved list, arguing that participation in a
service program by a religious organization involves excessive entanglement
between the religious group and the schools, constituting an aid and
advancement of the religious group’s mission that offends the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
II
CONDITIONS, COERCION, AND THE RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION
Before examining specific constitutional challenges to community service
programs, one must contend with a broad issue that sweeps across all discussion
of the constitutionality of such programs. The argument is that community
service programs amount to nothing more than conditions attached to the
“privilege” of a free public education and thus pose no constitutional problems
whatsoever. While students may be forced by compulsory education laws into
some accredited school until they reach a specified age, no student is literally
forced to attend public schools. Those students who can afford the cost may
attend private schools instead. This argument is a variant of one of the oldest
and most perplexing issues in constitutional law, that posed by the “rightprivilege” distinction and its doctrinal nemesis, the “doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.”
The right-privilege distinction is an old constitutional theme.5
The
distinction is grounded in a dichotomy between “rights” and mere “privileges.”
In their classic conception, rights are interests held by individuals independent
of the state. Rights exist prior to the state; individuals possess rights from birth,
by virtue of their humanity, as entitlements of natural law, as endowments from
the Creator, or as liberties enjoyed by man in his natural condition, before the
creation of government. The framers of the Constitution, following the social
contract theory of the philosopher John Locke, saw government as a voluntary
compact entered into by individuals to provide security for their rights. 6 Having
5. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
6. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Rights were thus not the creature of the state; rather the state was the
creature, brought into existence by the people to secure rights they already possessed—in the words of
Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, “to secure these rights governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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created the government to secure rights, the challenge is then determining how
to keep the government from abusing its power and destroying the very rights it
was founded to conserve.7
In contrast to rights, privileges are interests created by the grace of the state
and dependent for their existence on the state’s sufferance. Nothing in the U.S.
Constitution requires a state or local government to operate public schools. On
one level, the existence of free public schools is thus a privilege that the state is
presumptively free to extend or not extend to its student-citizens as it pleases.8
The right-privilege distinction in U.S. constitutional law operated on the
simple premise that government is entitled to grant citizens privileges on the
condition that they surrender or curtail the exercise of constitutional freedoms
that they would otherwise enjoy. Government, through the political process,
generates privileges as a form of public largess, and the recipients of that largess
have no grounds for complaint when it comes with strings attached: Beggars
can’t be choosers and gift horses are not to be looked in the mouth.9

7. In Madison’s words: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place, oblige it to control itself.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
8. Privileges may take virtually any form. They may be economic interests, such as public jobs,
welfare benefits, licenses to operate a business, offers of admission to a state university, or permits to
dump pollutants into a river. Privileges may also be non-economic, such as permission to an alien to
enter the country, early release from imprisonment through pardon or parole, transfer from one prison
to another, or permission for an attorney to argue a case in a court other than in the state of his or her
admission. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981) (discussing parole as
not implicating any “underlying right”); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1979) (characterizing pro
hac vice practice as a “privilege of appearing upon motion” but “not a right granted either by statute or
the Constitution”). See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982).
9. Oliver Wendell Holmes is most famously associated with advancing this kind of “rightprivilege” thinking. In Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d sub nom. Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then on the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, upheld an ordinance that prohibited public speaking in a municipal park without a
permit from the mayor. Holmes reasoned that because the city owned the park, it could establish rules
for use of the park just like a private landlord could. If it wanted to, the city could exclude access
altogether. The greater power to exclude access must include the lesser power to place conditions on
access, and the city could thus condition public speaking on obtaining a permit from the mayor.
Holmes did not think of this as a restriction on Mr. Davis’s freedom of speech, for he was free to speak
all he wanted. The First Amendment, however, guaranteed him only a right to speak, not a right of
entry onto property that was not his. Holmes did not seem concerned that the government would
abuse its power to place conditions on the receipt of benefits to achieve harsh or unjust results. For
Holmes, these were economic transactions, governed by market forces, and not subject to moral
concerns. The government was entitled to charge what the market would bear. In an opinion he wrote
on the Supreme Court, for example, Holmes dealt with whether financial conditions placed on a
corporation’s permission to do business in Kansas were too burdensome. Holmes asked, “Now what
has Kansas done?” His answer was: “She simply has said to the company that if it wants to do local
business it must pay a certain sum of money.” Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State of Kansas on the
relation of C.C. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes was apparently
unconcerned with Kansas’s possible extortionate abuse of its power, for he stated that “[i]t does not
matter if the sum is extravagant.” In another opinion, he elaborated: “In order to enter into most of
the relations of life people have to give up some of their [c]onstitutional rights. If a man makes a
contract he gives up the [c]onstitutional right that previously he had to be free from the hamper that he
puts upon himself.” Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 497 (1927).
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The tough-minded—if not downright mean-spirited—logic of the rightprivilege distinction has never gone down easily in U.S. constitutional thought
and has always been held in check by a counter-doctrine known as the “doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions.”10 Perhaps the most celebrated and oftenquoted articulation of this doctrine is from a 1972 Supreme Court decision
entitled Perry v. Sindermann,11 in which the Court emphatically declared the
following:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has
no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would
in effect be penalized and inhibited.12

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, however, is by no means a
seamless per se rule that results in the striking down of government attempts to
regulate speech in settings in which the government is using the fulcrum of
attaching conditions to largess. The modern analysis is actually a reconciliation
of the two competing doctrines—a reconciliation plagued, as most are, with a
degree of ambiguity and tension. The philosophical pull of the right-privilege
distinction against the philosophical pull of the competing doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions might be imagined as gravitational bodies locked in
bipolar orbit, each exerting its force on the doctrines that have evolved,
resulting in the evolution of various compromise tests and principles tailored to
the balance of interests in the various discrete areas of constitutional law in
which they appear.13

10. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Smolla, supra note 8; Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Van Alstyne, supra note 5.
11. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
12. Id. at 597. The language in Perry expresses a principle particularly vital to open cultures in
modern times, in which governmental activity permeates social life. In an open society, there must be
an implicit “escalation clause” at work in the evolution of constitutional thinking. As the power of
government to impinge on freedom increases, constitutional principles must escalate to meet the
challenge, preserving the power of the citizen to fight back against the government’s incursions. See,
e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
against unreasonable searches extended to cover electronic eavesdropping, even though the framers of
the Constitution could not have contemplated such an electronic search, because the Fourth
Amendment was intended to protect “people, not places”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,
309 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (invalidating a federal statute requiring a written request from the
intended recipient as a prerequisite to the delivery of overseas mail that contained Communist
propaganda material and noting that the First Amendment may be violated by “inhibition as well as
prohibition”); American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (noting that “the
fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not determine the
free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the
same coercive effect upon the exercise of [First] Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injun ctions
or taxes.”). “To ‘abridge’ means not merely to forbid altogether, but to curtail or to lessen.” William
W. Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 111 (1982).
13. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 170-219 (1992).
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The best understanding of the modern reconciliation of the right-privilege
notion and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is that the government
may not simply cite the right-privilege shibboleth and smugly walk away, while
claiming that it need not elaborate on its defense to the alleged constitutional
violation because the challenge is merely to a condition attached to public
largess.14 On the other hand, the fact that the challenged provision is a
condition attached to largess may be relevant to the balance of interests that
ought to be considered in deciding whether the incursion on constitutional
rights is justified. In assessing the balance of interests, relevancy is a key
touchstone. In a wide variety of constitutional law contexts, courts examine the
legitimacy of conditions placed upon the receipt of public largess by
determining the degree to which there is a significant nexus between the
condition being imposed and the benefit received. Gratuitous conditions—
those that appear to advance some agenda entirely divorced from the benefit
being dispersed or the mission of the government agency that is dispensing it—
will often be struck down as unconstitutional. Conditions that bear some
substantial relationship to the benefit, however, are more likely to be approved.
The nexus required between the condition and the benefit must be bolstered by
more than simply a minimally rational relationship: Courts will not indulge in
the highly deferential rational basis standard of government scrutiny under
which government programs are nearly always upheld against constitutional
attack. However, courts will also not engage in strict scrutiny in examining the
nexus, imposing highly rigorous standards of relevancy and narrow tailoring of
the sort frequently used to strike down race-based discrimination or contentbased regulation of speech.15
To place this in the specific context of challenges to community service
programs, consider how the coloration of a constitutional challenge to
community service might change as one moves from a free-standing general
criminal law, imposing a community service obligation on all high school age
children, to a community service program imposed on public high school
14. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (“Under the well-settled doctrine of
‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange
for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no
relationship to the property.”) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of
Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
15. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine in context of a
Takings Clause challenge).
We think the “reasonable relationship” test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer
to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not
adopt it as such, partly because the term “reasonable relationship” seems confusingly similar
to the term “rational basis” which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think a term such as “rough
proportionality” best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the [Fifth]
Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.
Id.
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students as a condition of graduation. Imagine that a state enacted a
community service requirement for all children between the ages of thirteen
and eighteen, requiring them to perform ten hours of public service each year
with a qualifying service organization or entity. Imagine that this general public
service law were enforced through a reporting mechanism requiring the filing of
a “public service return,” much like a tax return, filed under oath, with a section
to be completed by the service organization or agency for whom the service was
performed. Non-compliance—or fraudulent returns—would be punished by
criminal sanctions. A conscientious objector might argue that such a program
violates the Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription against involuntary
servitude, or is a deprivation of substantive liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, or a violation of First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech, association, or religion. In short, the universal public service
requirement would be subject to challenge on exactly the same grounds as a
service requirement imposed only on public school students as a condition of
graduation.
While the grounds for the challenge would be the same, the balance of
interests would not. The child making the challenge to the free-standing,
universal, public service requirement may or may not prevail in the challenge,
but the odds of success will be higher than the student challenging the school
service program. This outcome is not because of any mechanical application of
the right-privilege distinction, but because the government will have a wider
array of arguments to defend the service requirement in the public school
context than in the context of a sweeping public service duty imposed on all
children. Courts will appropriately tend to show greater deference to the
government making educational judgments in its capacity as educator than to
the government operating as pandemic regulator of the public weal. Even if the
incursion on constitutional liberties is the same in both contexts, the student has
a relationship to the school board different in kind from the child’s relationship
to the state legislature. If a court can be persuaded that the community service
is indeed genuinely integrated with the function and mission of the schools and
the concomitant benefits of public education the student is receiving, the court
will be much more disposed toward approving the program. With this broad
unconstitutional conditions framework in mind, analysis then turns to the
specific constitutional freedoms implicated by community service proposals.
III
COMMUNITY SERVICE AS INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in
the wake of the Civil War: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”16 A
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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student challenging a community service program would not be so brazen as to
characterize such programs as literally akin to the peculiar institution of African
slavery that was the historical impetus for the Thirteenth Amendment.
However, the student might very well argue with a degree of surface
verisimilitude that coerced public service is nonetheless both servitude and
involuntary, and thus barred by the broader meanings that might be ascribed to
the Amendment. Indeed, there are pronouncements from the Supreme Court
that appear to invite such broader understandings of the Amendment’s
coverage.17 Moreover, the concept of involuntary servitude is certainly
capacious enough to encompass at least extreme forms of the impressment and
exploitation of children, such as the reprehensible Italian padrone system.18
Yet if the term “involuntary servitude” is sufficiently pliable to embrace
more than slavery or peonage to trigger the Thirteenth Amendment, the
program must approximate slavery in its severity and intensity. The question is
whether in its practical operation and function, the program being attacked is
akin to the evils of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment, at its core, was
passed to abolish.19 Unless there is a credible case that the program genuinely
possesses the practical incidents of true slavery, courts are unlikely to find the
Thirteenth Amendment an appropriate vehicle for striking down the program.20
The mere claim that some percentage of one’s labor or wealth has been
commandeered by a state for the benefit of others will not, standing alone, be
understood as constituting involuntary servitude. Much of the modern welfare
state is structured around the redistribution of income and wealth. At a broad
conceptual level, to the extent one’s income is taken by the state through taxes
for distribution to others, an involuntary servitude is being placed on one’s
17. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (“While the general spirit of the
phrase ‘involuntary servitude’ is easily comprehended, the exact range of conditions it prohibits is
harder to define.”); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905) (holding that the Thirteenth
Amendment “denounces a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is
created”).
18. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 957-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
I agree with the Government that the background of both those statutes suggests that
Congress intended to protect persons subjected to involuntary servitude by forms of coercion
more subtle than force. The Padrone statute, for example, was designed to outlaw what was
known as the “padrone system” whereby padrones in Italy inveigled from their parents young
boys whom the padrones then used without pay as beggars, bootblacks, or street musicians.
Once in this country, without relatives to turn to, the children had little choice but to submit to
the demands of those asserting authority over them, yet this form of coercion was deemed
sufficient—without any evidence of physical or legal coercion—to hold the boys in
“involuntary servitude.” . . . Given the nature of the system the Padrone statute aimed to
eliminate, the statute’s use of the words “involuntary servitude” demonstrates not that the
statute was “aimed only at compulsion of service through physical or legal coercion,” . . . but
that Congress understood “involuntary servitude.”
Id. (citing United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676, 682-84 (S.D. N.Y. 1880)).
19. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (“[T]he phrase ‘involuntary servitude’ was intended to extend
‘to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would
tend to produce like undesirable results.’”) (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)).
20. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964) (explaining that the ban on
involuntary servitude “was to abolish all practices whereby subjection having some of the incidents of
slavery was legally enforced”).
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labor. In a progressive taxation system, most citizens work some days for the
government and some days for themselves. When tax dollars are redistributed,
most citizens might be seen as working some days for the benefit of others. Yet
this form of indirect labor transfer, and many other more direct impositions of
labor for the service of others, have never been interpreted as violations of the
Thirteenth Amendment and could not be interpreted as such without stretching
the purpose of the Amendment wildly beyond its animating purpose and
historical context.21 Similarly, requirements that citizens perform certain civic
duties, such as jury service, have not been construed as involuntary servitude.22
The most gripping example is the military draft, a conscription that not only
entails a complete deprivation of one’s ordinary liberty, but the risk of crippling
injury or death in the service of one’s country. The military draft has been
rhetorically attacked as a form of involuntary servitude that violates the
Thirteenth Amendment,23 but, despite the hyperbolic utility of the argument, it
has never been taken seriously by the Supreme Court. As early as the 1918
Selective Draft Law Cases,24 the Court stated that
as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the
citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the
defense of the rights and honor of the nation as the result of a war declared by the
great representative body of the people can be said to be the imposition of involuntary
servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are
constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere
statement.25

Against this general backdrop, Thirteenth Amendment challenges to school
community service programs should not be deemed viable. Community service
programs are simply too far removed from anything that might be persuasively
labeled as a badge or incident of slavery to run afoul of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
In three significant federal appellate decisions analyzing
challenges to school public service programs—Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro
City Board of Education,26 Immediato v. Rye Neck School District,27 and Steirer
v. Bethlehem Area School District28—Thirteenth Amendment challenges to such
programs were rebuffed through the application of such a contextual analysis.
21. See United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (sustaining
requirements that an attorney perform pro bono work); United States v. Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121,
128-29 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that, in an action brought by the government to reco ver damages from
a physician who had not performed obligated service after participating in National Health Service
Corps Scholarship Program, the action for damages did not threaten the physician with involuntary
servitude), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1987).
22. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973) (holding that jury duty
compensated at the rate of one dollar per day did not constitute involuntary servitude).
23. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1919) (“The document in question upon its
first printed side recited the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, said that the idea embodied in
it was violated by the conscription act and that a conscript is little better than a convict.”).
24. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
25. Id. at 390.
26. 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
27. 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 813 (1996).
28. 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993).
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Public school service programs typically involve work that is not particularly
severe in its physical demands or onerous in its sacrifice of time. Teenagers are
usually forced to perform forty to sixty hours of work over several years. They
generally have a wide range of service options, mitigating the likelihood of
being forced into any program that is highly impalatable. The programs usually
permit flexibility in scheduling, which is usually arranged by the student. Most
importantly, the programs are designed primarily to benefit the student,
through both the experience of public service and the introspection and analysis
required by the accompanying academic exercises, such as writing papers
describing or reflecting on the experience. This benefit is probably the single
most important difference between community service and genuine involuntary
servitude, for the overriding educational goal of community service programs
largely defines the line between exploitation and education.29
IV
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Under the rubric of substantive due process, U.S. constitutional law shelters
certain aspects of privacy and autonomy from governmental interference. In
this century, the doctrine was once often invoked to strike down government
legislation that interfered with property rights and entrepreneurial liberty,
treating the Due Process Clause as the embodiment of laissez-faire economic
theory.30 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and others rebelled from this
constitutionalization of laissez-faire economics.31
This rebellion would
ultimately prevail during the New Deal when the Supreme Court repudiated
the invocation of substantive due process principles as a legitimate vehicle for
overturning economic regulation.32 However, substantive due process theory
has had considerably more staying power regarding the regulation of noneconomic aspects of life and has been the principal doctrinal device for the
protection of individual privacy, particularly in the realm of procreation and
reproduction.33 Substantive due process principles may thus be invoked to
29. See Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It is important to note
that the purpose of the program is not exploitative. Rather, it is educational, particularly when coupled
with the related classroom discussions.”); Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 1000 (3d
Cir. 1993).
[T]he community service program is primarily designed for the students’ own benefit and
education, notwithstanding some incidental benefit to the recipients of the services. An
educational requirement does not become involuntary servitude merely because one of the
stated objectives of the Program is that the students will work “without receiving pay.”
Id.
30. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. See id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics. . . . Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are
likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.”).
32. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
33. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming the “core” of abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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challenge abridgements of certain fundamental rights on the theory that such
rights are protected against most forms of governmental interference by the
direct force of the Due Process Clause. 34
In the specific context of mandatory community service programs, those
who invoke the substantive due process doctrine to attack such programs may
plausibly point to a longstanding line of substantive due process cases that have
paid particular solicitude to the rights of parents and children to make choices
for themselves over matters relating to education and child-rearing. For
example, a series of decisions in the 1920s established the constitutional rights
of parents and teachers to instruct children in the German language,35 the right
of parents to send children to non-public schools,36 and the right to send
children to foreign language schools.37
Community public service programs, however, do not implicate the
wholesale deprivations of autonomy and choice in child-rearing and education
that this venerable line of substantive due process cases were created to
vindicate. The devil is in the detail, if you will, and there is a world of
difference between broad legislative enactments that forbid instruction in
private schools or foreign languages and programs that impose specific
educational requirements on students attending public schools.

(establishing a constitutional right to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking
down a regulation limiting use of contraceptives).
34. “Substantive due process” challenges are to be distinguished from “procedural due process”
attacks, which challenge the procedural fairness of a government proceeding or decision, claiming, for
example, that some form of hearing is required before a government benefit, such as a welfare check,
may be terminated. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). A substantive due process
challenge, instead, invokes the notion that the Due Process Clause bars “certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986). Substantive due process challenges have come to be understood as meaningful only in
the context of abridgments of “fundamental rights,” such as those deemed “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), or “deeply rooted in this [n]ation’s
history and tradition.” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). When the right
infringed is accepted by the court as “fundamental,” the “strict scrutiny” standard of judicial review is
triggered, under which the government must justify its regulation with a “compelling” interest, and
demonstrate that the regulation is “narrowly tailored” to effectuate that interest. See, e.g., Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
35. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (striking down a Nebraska law forbidding
foreign language instruction).
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the
term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id.
36. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding that “interfer[ing] with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”
violates the Constitution).
37. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (overturning Hawaii restriction on
foreign language schools and holding that “[t]he Japanese parent has the right to direct the education
of his own child without unreasonable restrictions”).
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Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a court could find that a community
service program violates substantive due process principles while not
simultaneously jeopardizing the constitutionality of the entire notion of
compulsory school attendance. Yet, the same cases from the 1920s that struck
down limits on educational choices of parents also appeared to assume as
beyond peradventure the supposition that the states had plenary power to
enforce compulsory education laws. In Meyer v. Nebraska,38 for example, the
Court noted that
[t]he power of the state to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable
regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in
English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the state’s power to
39
prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports.”

In more recent times, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder40 explicitly
acknowledged that “[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a [s]tate, having
a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education. 41
If the state can normally force a child into school without violating the
Constitution, the claim that community service programs violate the Fourteenth
Amendment is reduced to an argument that community service is not school. If
schools imposed community service programs for the utterly gratuitous and
exploitative purpose of obtaining cost-free child labor, the disconnection
between the educational function and the service requirement might be so stark
that a court would be moved to treat the program as a violation of the
Constitution. Of course, this will almost certainly never be the case. School
districts impose community service programs not because they provide a
convenient administrative device for securing a large pool of volunteer labor,
but out of the conviction that community service will teach students the
manifold, laudatory values of civic contribution and participation, and inculcate
them with a greater sense of citizenship and social responsibility.42 The interests
that drive compulsory community service programs are thus but subsets of the
interests that largely drive public education in general.43 As the Supreme Court
stated in Brown v. Board of Education,44
[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39. Id. at 402.
40. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
41. Id. at 213; see also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968) (“[A] substantial body
of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to
satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of
instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.”).
42. See generally Kraft, supra note 2.
43. See Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment
Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213 (1973) (“It has long been an American dream that education
affords a means for upward mobility in an open society. The Supreme Court . . . has framed much of
the country’s constitutional law on the unstated premise that formal education is the means by which
American society remains fluid yet cohesive, pluralistic yet unitary, aspiring to be a democracy while
being governed by a meritocracy.”).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed force. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.45

Once we are quibbling not about the power of the state to compel
attendance at school, but rather the power of the state to define the terms and
conditions of schooling, the force of any substantive due process attack is
dramatically diminished, for we are no longer facing a fundamental incursion on
individual liberty, but an individual’s fundamental disagreement with a tenet of
educational philosophy. Courts will routinely dismiss this sort of micro-level
challenge to the particulars of a school system’s educational choices, rejecting it
based on the most minimal rational basis forms of scrutiny.46
This outcome is sound. If, after the bouillabaisse of debate over whether it
is good or bad educational philosophy to expose children to community service
through such mandatory programs, a political consensus emerges that it is good
philosophy, there is no cogent reason for judicial second-guessing of that
decision.47 Public schools constantly make choices about policy that are
controversial and vehemently contested within the community. Virtually no
aspect of a public school system’s decisionmaking is likely to please everyone
within its constituency; there will always be students and parents who would
like to opt out of heavy homework loads, physical education, courses in sex
education, or any number of other curricular initiatives. The presumptive rule,
however, is that the arguments against such programs must be vented and
resolved in the political arena, and they are not subject to serious challenge
merely on the general claim that the choices made impermissibly infringe on the
broad liberty of parents to direct their children’s education.48 To the extent that
parents direct their children’s education by directing them to public schools,
they forfeit the right of selective micro-management.
45. Id. at 493.
46. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177-79 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1111 (1997); Inmediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 813 (1996); see also Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 1000 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993).
47. See generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the
Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169 (1996).
48. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
These fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” essential to a democratic society
must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the
views expressed may be unpopular. But these “fundamental values” must also take into
account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities
of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.
Id.
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V
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION BASED ON RELIGION OR IDEOLOGY
If sweeping claims that community service programs constitute involuntary
servitude or violate due process are not persuasive, claims based on more
carefully honed arguments may in some circumstances be more impressive.
Such arguments are that the programs violate a particular student’s First
Amendment rights of free association, free speech, or the free exercise of
religion.
It is useful to examine objections to mandatory community service
predicated on religious or philosophical scruples under one heading because of
the importance of a single Supreme Court decision, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 49 that
speaks to both religion and philosophy, and helps at once to illustrate two
critical points: General ideological objections to community service programs
are not likely to prevail, whether cast as free speech or free association claims,
and specific religious objections to such programs may be successful, but only in
the relatively unlikely circumstance that no service alternative were available to
a student that did not substantially interfere with his or her religious scruples.
In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could not enforce its
compulsory school attendance law to require members of the Amish Mennonite
Church to send their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children to Wisconsin public
schools because such compelled attendance would substantially interfere with
the free exercise of religion of the Amish children and their parents.50 Yoder
exists in some tension with the Supreme Court’s subsequent landmark decision
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
in which the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by neutral
laws of general applicability that happen to place substantial burdens on
religion.51 Smith involved a Free Exercise Clause claim brought by members of
the Native American Church who were denied unemployment benefits when
they lost their jobs because they had ingested peyote in small amounts as part of
a sacramental ritual within their church.52 The church members challenged an
Oregon criminal statute forbidding the use of peyote, claiming a constitutional
right to a religious exemption from an otherwise applicable criminal law.53
Smith followed a line of Supreme Court decisions adopting the view that the
Free Exercise Clause did not require exemption from the application of
generally applicable laws.54 In Reynolds v. United States,55 for example, the
49. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. See id. at 217-18.
51. 494 U.S. 872, 877-82, reh’g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
52. See id. at 872.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting a claim by an Amish employer, on
behalf of himself and his employees, seeking an exemption from collection and payment of Social
Security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith prohibited participation in governmental support
programs); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (upholding the military Selective Service
System against the claim that it violated free exercise by conscripting persons who opposed a particular
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Court rejected the assertion that criminal laws forbidding polygamy could not
be constitutionally applied to persons who practiced polygamy pursuant to
religious command.56
Before Smith, however, there were also several Supreme Court decisions,
including Yoder, that seemed to endorse the principle that even neutral laws of
general applicability substantially burdening a religious practice must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to
effectuate that interest.57 In Smith, the Supreme Court resolved this split by
opting for the line of precedent typified by Reynolds, holding that the Free
way on religious grounds); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (sustaining Sunday-closing laws
against the claim that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose religions compelled them
to refrain from work on other days); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (holding that a
mother could be prosecuted under the child labor laws for using her children to dispense religious
literature in the streets, on the ground that there was no constitutional infirmity in excluding children of
the religious adherent from doing what no other children could do); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940) (noting that “[c]onscientious scruples have not . . . relieved the
individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction or religious
beliefs”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (sustaining application of anti-polygamy laws
against persons who practiced polygamy out of religious convictions).
55. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
56. See id. at 167; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (noting that the Free
Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law
of general applicability”).
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration,
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Frankfurter, J., Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 594-95 (1940)). The Court’s quote from Gobitis was arguably ill-conceived overkill because since
Gobitis, the Supreme Court applied Justice Frankfurter’s theory to sustain a school board’s power to
discipline a Jehovah’s Witness child for failing to salute the American flag. Gobitis remained good law
for only three years. It was overruled in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943), where Justice Jackson wrote those famous lines: “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.” Id. at 642. The Gobitis Court erred in failing to see a distinction between
“obedience to general law” when that law proscribes only action, such as polygamy—or, as in Smith,
ingestion of a drug—and obedience to law requiring the affirmative profession of beliefs, political or
religious.
57. A series of cases involving government benefits such as unemployment compensation,
emanating from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S 398 (1963), seemed to require the application of the strict
scrutiny standard even to neutral laws of general applicability that only indirectly burdened religion.
See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged by her private employer
because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. In Sherbert, there was no law
commanding the claimant to do that which was forbidden by her religion, or forbidding her from doing
that which her religion commanded. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
could be violated even when the burden at issue was only indirect:
But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. For “[i]f the purpose or effect of a
law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect.”
Id. at 403-04 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
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Exercise Clause imposed no heightened constitutional burdens on government
when it sought merely to enforce neutral and generally applicable laws.58
[G]overnment’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct . . . cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector’s spiritual development. To make an individual’s obligation to obey
such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except
where the State’s interest is compelling . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense.59

However, the Court in Smith did not overrule Yoder, but instead sought to
distinguish it on the ground that Yoder and similar cases did not involve “the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . .
or the rights of parents . . . to direct the education of their children.”60 In
contrast, the Court in Smith explained that the case before it did “not present
such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity or parental right.”61
This argument was not particularly satisfying, because the Court never
explained why a hybrid constitutional claim should be stronger than a purebred
one, or why the cases it purported to distinguish had seemed to quite selfconsciously express their holdings in terms of protecting the free exercise of
religion.62 Indeed, Yoder was particularly problematic when measured against
the Smith Court’s argument, because in Yoder, the Court not only articulated its
ruling entirely in Free Exercise Clause terms,63 but also discussed extensively
whether the objections the Amish had to sending their children to school were
genuinely religious in nature, or were instead based on the non-religious
elements of the Amish “way of life.”64 The Amish claimed the two objections
were essentially inseparable,65 but the Court delved more deeply into the

58. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-88.
59. Id. at 885 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
60. Id. at 881-82 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating school attendance
laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (striking down a flat tax on solicitation as applied to
dissemination of religious literature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (same); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (striking down a permit requirement for solicitation of
contributions as applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing religious literature); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a law requiring children to attend public rather than private
schools)).
61. Id. at 882.
62. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (“Such a censorship of religion as the
means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment.”).
63. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade
against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief,
it must appear either that the [s]tate does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id.
64. Id. at 215-19.
65. See id. at 215.
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matter, and made it clear that the success of the Amish’s claim was dependent
on it being grounded in religion, as opposed to a mere philosophical belief, such
as the teachings of Henry David Thoreau:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations;
to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief. Although a determination of what is a “religious” belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters
of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish
asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the
social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not
rest on a religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than
religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.66

The Court held that religious beliefs trumped the interests of the state of
Wisconsin in enforcing its compulsory attendance laws only after assuring itself
that the claims of the Amish were authentically religious in nature.67 Thus,
Yoder is unintelligible as a free speech claim or substantive due process claim.
If the parents had merely asserted their rights to have their philosophical beliefs
vindicated under the Free Speech Clause, or their rights to direct the education
of their own children vindicated under the Due Process Clause, the Court
We come then to the quality of the claims of the respondents concerning the alleged
encroachment of Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance statute on their rights and the
rights of their children to the free exercise of the religious beliefs they and their forbears have
adhered to for almost three centuries. In evaluating those claims we must be careful to
determine whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim,
inseparable and interdependent.
Id.
66. Id. (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concu rring in result);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
67. See id. at 216-17.
Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see that the record in this case
abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized
group, and intimately related to daily living. That the Old Order Amish daily life and
religious practice stem from their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal
interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, “be not
conformed to this world. . . .” This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover,
for the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic belief. As the expert
witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their
entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly
enforced rules of the church community. The record shows that the respondents’ religious
beliefs and attitude toward life, family, and home have remained constant—perhaps some
would say static—in a period of unparalleled progress in human knowledge generally and
great changes in education. The respondents freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of
faith, that their religious beliefs and what we would today call “life style” have not altered in
fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in a church-oriented community, separated from
the outside world and “worldly” influences, their attachment to nature and the soil, is a way
inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against the pressure to
conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of
dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them apart from much of
contemporary society; these customs are both symbolic and practical.
Id.
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would have rejected their claim.68 The injection of religious belief obviously
made the difference. The Court in Yoder clearly thought that it made enough
of a difference to require striking down the application of the Wisconsin law
even though it was both of “general applicability”69 and ostensibly “neutral.”70
As significant as Wisconsin’s interests in enforcing its laws may have been, they
were not enough for the Yoder Court and its almost nostalgic Americana
sympathy for the uncomplicated and virtuous life of the Amish people. 71 Yoder,
along with prior cases arising from substantive due process principles, instructs
that in the absence of a plausible Religion Clause claim, courts should review
challenges to school regulations under the relatively deferential standard of
“reasonableness.”72
68. See id. at 215.
[W]e must be careful to determine whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life
are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent. A way of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
is based on purely secular considerations.
Id.
69. Id. at 220.
But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police
power of the [s]tate is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the [s]tate to control,
even under regulations of general applicability.
Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
70. Id.
Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin’s requirement for school
attendance to age 16 applies uniformly to all citizens of the [s]tate and does not, on its face,
discriminate against religions or a particular religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate
secular concerns. A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion.
Id.
71. See id. at 217-18.
As the society around the Amish has become more populous, urban, industrialized, and
complex, particularly in this century, government regulation of human affairs has
correspondingly become more detailed and pervasive. The Amish mode of life has thus come
into conflict increasingly with requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic
insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards. So long as compulsory education laws
were confined to eight grades of elementary basic education imparted in a nearby rural
schoolhouse, with a large proportion of students of the Amish faith, the Old Order Amish had
little basis to fear that school attendance would expose their children to the worldly influence
they reject. But modern compulsory secondary education in rural areas is now largely carried
on in a consolidated school, often remote from the student’s home and alien to his daily home
life. As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs of the modern secondary
school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish
religion; modern laws requiring compulsory secondary education have accordingly
engendered great concern and conflict. The conclusion is inescapable that secondary
schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and
values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious development of
the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community at the
crucial adolescent stage of development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of
the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child.
Id.
72. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting that “[t]he Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional right to send
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Courts faced with a free exercise of religion challenge to a community
service program must first deal with this threshold tension between Smith and
Yoder. One might think that Yoder, as the precedent more specifically germane
to compulsory school requirements, would easily trump Smith in the context of
school community service programs. However, this matter is not necessarily so
simple. To the extent that no one can interpose a cogent substantive due
process claim against such programs, a court might take the position that in
reality they do not present a genuine hybrid claim at all, because the substantive
due process claim is nothing but a cosmetic makeweight. Faced with a pure
religion claim, a court might reason that it is actually Smith rather than Yoder
that controls.
This whole analysis is nothing more than hair-splitting, indulging distinctions
that as much as anything reveal the silliness of Smith’s hybrid-right concoction.
Smith, moreover, has itself been highly unpopular. Congress attempted to
overrule Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.73
This effort was rebuked by the Supreme Court when it struck down the Act on
federalism grounds in City of Boerne v. Flores.74 However, even in the Supreme
Court, there are signs that a critical mass may be forming around the consensus
that Smith should be reconsidered, and perhaps repudiated or modified.75
Even if courts select Yoder as the governing precedent, either because it
remains distinguishable from Smith or because Smith is someday discredited,
Yoder’s potency as a precedent in challenging community service programs
ought to be limited. Even though the Amish in Yoder were able to mount a
factually persuasive argument that the whole regime of compulsory public
their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools that offer specialized
instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children with private school education
unfettered by reasonable government regulation”) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 n.4 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (holding that “[w]here parents make a ‘free exercise claim,’. . . the Pierce
reasonableness test is inapplicable and the State’s action must be measured by a stricter test, the test
developed under the Free Exercise Clause”)).
73. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
74. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, in which Congress attempted to invoke section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to justify a federal religious freedom statute binding on state and local
governments. The Court in Boerne struck down the law because the Court had already held that the
standard Congress imposed on state and local governments was not required by the substantive
provisions of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. After Boerne, Congress may not use section
five to “enforce” rights that are not recognized under section one of the Amendment. The Court in
Boerne thus explained that section five grants Congress only a “remedial” power to make effective the
“substantive constitutional prohibitions against the [s]tates” contained in section one. 521 U.S. at 522.
Such “remedial” legislation, the Court emphasized, “should be adapted to the mischief and wrong
which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to provide against,” unconstitutional action by the
states. Id. at 532.
75. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., joined in part by Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 565
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This was not the first time members of the
Court have called for a reexamination of Smith. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S.
at 571-72 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 577-78 (Blackmun, J.,
joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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education in Wisconsin ran contrary to the fundamental values of Amish
religion, it would not be so easy for any religious adherent to make a similarly
persuasive claim with regard to a community service requirement. By
hypothesis, any student who makes a religion-based attack on a community
service requirement already will be attending public school. Thus, the general
values and operation of the public schools would not, by hypothesis, be
inconsistent with the student’s attendance at public school. The student then
would have to demonstrate that there was something specifically objectionable
to coerced community service over and above attendance at public school
generally. It is difficult to imagine what this objection might be, especially in
light of the fact that many religious traditions share the beliefs of altruism,
selflessness, service to one’s larger community, and charity. Moreover, most
community service programs will have so many service alternatives that are
devoid of any palpable religious content that it will be difficult for any student
to convince a court that no available service alternatives consistent with the
student’s religious belief structure exist. For any student who could not credibly
make the claim that community service as such ran contrary to his or her
religious beliefs, a free exercise challenge would therefore be ineffective.
If this analysis renders viable religion challenges to public service challenges
statistically improbable, however, it does not render them mathematically
impossible.76 There may be religions grounded in what most would regard as
the “dark side of the force” for which the entire idea of community service is
heretical. To the extent Yoder—and not Smith—controls, and to the extent
participation in any public service program is convincingly inconsistent with a
student’s religious beliefs, it is at least conceivable that application of the public
service program to a specific student might violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Only within these narrow and relatively unlikely parameters, however, would
such a claim be potentially viable.
Outside of religion-based claims, conscientious objector attacks on
community service programs are even weaker. Students challenging community
service programs on forced speech or forced association grounds will have a
difficult time explaining how the typical community service program genuinely
implicates such First Amendment concerns at all. Again, of course, a student
might object to the wholesale notion of forced volunteerism, arguing that the
entire program indulges in a social philosophy antithetical to the student’s
beliefs. If disagreement with volunteerism as such is the student’s real
complaint, then under Yoder, the basis of the student’s objection again becomes
critical. Imagine a student who is an ardent disciple of the philosophies of Ayn
76. See Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 996 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824
(1993).
Nonetheless, we do not discount entirely the possibility that a school-imposed requirement of
community service could, in some contexts, implicate First Amendment considerations.
Arguably, a student who was required to provide community service to an organization whose
message conflicted with the student’s contrary view could make that claim.
Id.
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Rand, believing that the single-minded pursuit of individual self-interest is the
only principled path to the good life.77 This belief would likely be characterized
as a philosophical objection and would not trigger the heightened scrutiny
applicable to religion-based claims applied in Yoder. Moreover, to the extent
volunteerism was deemed philosophically objectionable to the student, this
claim would really not be a true forced-speech or forced-association claim at all.
The student’s objection would not be that he or she is being forced to say
anything or support any message the student finds repugnant, or even to
associate with causes or persons with whom the student does not wish to
associate, but rather that the student is being forced to serve when the student
does not choose to serve. Service, however, is not the same as speech.
There are powerful First Amendment doctrines that forbid forced speech,
or forced association. These related notions often may be successfully invoked
to avoid being coerced into supporting a cause or creed with which one
disagrees. While the First Amendment is typically concerned with preventing
government from restricting expression, it is also implicated when the
government attempts to compel expression. “At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence.”78
This statement reflects a core constitutional principle:
Government action “that requires the utterance of a particular message favored
by the [g]overnment, contravenes this essential right.”79 Such laws “pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public
debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”80
In an eloquent and celebrated passage, the Supreme Court declared in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that, “[i]f there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.”81 The Court in Barnette struck down a compulsory flag-salute and
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance for school children when Jehovah’s
Witnesses objected to the compulsory flag-salute on religious grounds.82
Barnette forbids persons from “being compelled to affirm their belief in any
governmentally prescribed position or view.”83 Similarly, the Establishment
Clause forbids public school officials from leading students in prayer at all in an
academic setting.84 Moreover, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme Court held
77.
(1943).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See generally AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1992); AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See id.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 7488 (1980) (describing the holding in Barnette).
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588-89 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962).
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that a Jehovah’s Witness could not be compelled to display the motto “Live
Free or Die” on his New Hampshire license plates.85 Wooley, like Barnette, is
powerful authority for the proposition that the state cannot compel citizens to
recite patriotic civic rituals or slogans. Wooley created a constitutional right for
citizens to cover up the motto on their individual plates and more broadly
underscored the importance of the right not to speak under government
compulsion, emphasizing that “where the State’s interest is to disseminate an
ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message.”86 As the Court stated in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, “all speech inherently involves choices of
what to say and what to leave unsaid.”87 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, the Court held unconstitutional an Ohio ban on anonymous
campaign literature, emphasizing the First Amendment rights of speakers to
make their own “decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
publication,” and to choose for themselves what to “include or exclude.”88 In
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, the
Supreme Court, drawing heavily on Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, spoke eloquently of the centrality of this
autonomy principle in our First Amendment tradition:
Our tradition of free speech commands that a speaker who takes to the street corner
to express his views in this way should be free from interference by the [s]tate based
on the content of what he says. The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction
be used to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal
to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more
certain antithesis. While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of
harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however
enlightened either purpose may strike the government.89

Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of association
encompasses not merely the affirmative right to associate with those whom one
seeks to join,90 but a contrasting right not to associate with those one seeks to
85. 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
86. Id.
87. 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986).
88. 514 U.S. 334, 341, 348 (1995); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 650 (1994)
(noting that “the FCC’s oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any particular
type of programming”).
89. 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) (referring to 512 U.S. 622).
90. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982).
Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some
members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to be imposed by reason of
association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and
that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.
Id.; see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, Cal., 454 U.S.
290, 294 (1981) (“[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. . . . [B]y collective effort
individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.”);
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avoid.91 This right not to associate may be abridged by the state only with
justifications that will withstand the rigors of strict scrutiny and its requirement
that the law at issue be supported by a showing that it is narrowly tailored to
serve compelling governmental interests.92 Finally, cases which hold that
individuals may not be taxed against their will to lend financial support to
causes with which they disagree are related to both forced-speech and free
association principles.93
Given this impressive array of precedent, one might mistakenly think that
forced-speech or forced-association challenges to community service programs
would have some appreciable chance of success. They do not. If the only way a
student could fulfill the community service obligation were to support a
message antithetical to the student’s beliefs, or engage in objectionable
association, a student might have a plausible forced-speech or forcedassociation claim. On the contrary, community service programs usually allow
students to select from a wide array of service alternatives, including many
organizations and agencies with no distinct ideological mission or identity.94
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (noting that a “blanket prohibition of association with
a group having both legal and illegal aims” would present “a real danger that legitimate political
expression or association would be impaired”); NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once
recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”).
91. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. Such
a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that
brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not
to associate.
Id.
92. Id. (“The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on
that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.”).
93. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes
not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution
requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by
employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so
against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.
Id.
94. When the group with which the student associates has no strong ideological imprint, courts are
not likely to take seriously the claim that forced association implicates any strong First Amendment
interests. In the Jaycees decision, for example, the Supreme Court was highly skeptical that the highly
inclusive Jaycees possessed any strong associational interests. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625-28.
Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545-47
(1987), a sequel to the Jaycees decision, the Supreme Court followed the framework of Jaycees and held
that the First Amendment was not violated by a California law that required the Rotary Club to cease
discrimination against women. The Court observed that
[a]s a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions on “public questions,” including
political or international issues. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of commen dable
service activities that are protected by the First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not
require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. It does not require them to
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The actual service tasks performed by the students may similarly be utterly
devoid of any expressive message falling within the protection of the First
Amendment. Cutting grass for the park district, painting a fence for a local
school, picking up trash on a county highway, or feeding animals at an animal
shelter are all forms of community service that could never be characterized
convincingly as expressive activity, or as implicating any serious interests in
avoiding unwanted forms of association.95 As long as the program contains a
reasonable degree of flexibility, it seems almost certain that virtually all
students could find some form of community service they are able to perform
without running against any deeply held ideological or associational beliefs.
Indeed, community service programs typically contain provisions that allow
students to seek approval of community service programs that they themselves
have identified and that are not part of an established list.96
VI
ORGANIZATIONAL INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
Mandatory community service programs may also be challenged on the
grounds that they exclude certain groups and organizations that deserve to be
included or include certain groups that ought to be excluded. For example, a
program may choose not to permit partisan political groups to participate.97
Alternatively, it may choose to exclude religious organizations. On the other
hand, a program might include a pervasively religious organization,
precipitating a claim that the inclusion of such a group violates the
Establishment Clause.
In each scenario, neutrality is the guiding constitutional principle. Eligibility

abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good
will, and peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit
members who do not reflect a cross section of the community. Indeed, by opening
membership to leading business and professional women in the community, Rotary Clubs are
likely to obtain a more representative cross section of community leaders with a broadened
capacity for service.
Id. at 548-49 (citation omitted).
95. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—
for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. We
think the activity of these dance-hall patrons—coming together to engage in recreational
dancing—is not protected by the First Amendment. Thus this activity qualifies neither as a
form of “intimate association” nor as a form of “expressive association” as those terms were
described in Roberts.
Id.
96. In Herndon, for example, students could receive credit for service performed for organizations
that were not included on the school system’s list of approved organizations, provided that the student
received approval from a committee comprised of teachers, students, and members of the community
organizations charged with administering the program. The student’s high school principal was the
final decisionmaker concerning community service credit. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City
Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1996).
97. See id. (excluding political groups).
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to participate as an approved service entity may rightly be conceptualized as a
government benefit, and serious First Amendment concerns would be raised by
any program that consciously excluded groups based on viewpoint alone,
including religious viewpoint. Thus, if a community service program permitted
students to satisfy their service obligations by assisting with feeding programs
for the homeless, it would violate the First Amendment if the school district
allowed students to work for feeding programs run by a secular organization
dedicated to assisting the poor, but not for identical programs run by a local
church.98
However, these neutrality principles are not quite so pristine when dealing
with inclusive decisions. Certainly, it does not violate the Establishment Clause
to include religious groups within a class of other non-religious organizations
performing similar service functions. The flip-side of the principle that a school
board would violate the First Amendment by discriminating against the
religious soup kitchen is that a school board would not violate the
Establishment Clause if it included such a kitchen.99
A far more difficult case, however, would exist if a school board decided to
exclude a service program sponsored by a private group from participation on
the ground that the private group’s ideological mission ran directly contrary to
the civic values of the school. Take, for example, the previously proffered
hypothetical in which a local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan creates what purports
to be a community service program, and a school board refuses to certify the
program as a qualified public service organization on the ground that the Klan’s
racist agenda renders it inappropriate for participation in any joint venture with
public schools. If the example seems farfetched, modern American life teaches
that truth is often stranger than fiction, and that such a scenario is not at all
beyond the range of possibility.
In such a case, the Klan would argue that schools cannot have it both ways.

98. See Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 835-37 (1995)
(holding that, in a case in which a student organization that published a newspaper with Christian
editorial viewpoint was denied funding by the [u]niversity solely because of its religious perspective, the
denial of funding amounted to viewpoint discrimination that violated the free speech provisions of the
First Amendment); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down a Tennessee law barring
ministers of the Gospel or priests of any denomination whatever from serving as constitutional
convention delegates on grounds that such a provision discriminated against religion and conditioned
the free exercise of his religion or the surrender of the right to seek office).
99. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the [u]niversity to deny eligibility
to student publications because of their viewpoint. The neutrality commanded of the [s]tate
by the separate Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by the [u]niversity’s course
of action. The viewpoint discrimination inherent in the [u]niversity’s regulation required
public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern their underlying
philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and belief. That course of action was a
denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to
religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. There
is no Establishment Clause violation in the [u]niversity’s honoring its duties under the Free
Speech Clause.
Id.

SMOLLA_FMT.DOC

138

06/22/00 9:29 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 62: No. 4

They cannot claim that participation by religious organizations does not offend
the Establishment Clause because merely permitting such organizations to
participate does not constitute the imprimatur or endorsement of the school,
and, on the other hand, claim that entanglement with a hate group would in
some sense sully the school’s mission and function.
On balance, however, a convincing distinction does seem to exist. A school
board that seeks to exclude a religious group would likely do so not out of
particularized antipathy to the church group’s theology or mission. Indeed, to
the extent that a central tenet of the religious group’s theology was the common
religious one of assisting the less fortunate and loving one’s neighbor, the
religious mission and the secular civic value would generally coincide. Rather, a
school’s attempt to exclude a religious group would normally be based on its
abstract concerns about too much entanglement between church and state. The
Supreme Court’s public forum cases, which hold that these generalized fears of
entanglement do not rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation,
effectively answer and neutralize this argument.100 The constitutional command
“is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a [s]tate refused to let religious
groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality
but hostility toward religion.”101 In short, the schools have no free-standing,
case-specific reason not to include the religious group.
In contrast, a school that sought to exclude a Klan-operated public service
program could make a sincere argument that any association between the
school board and such a hate group would run so counter to the values of racial
tolerance and human dignity fostered by the school that inclusion would defeat
the very purposes of civic responsibility and good citizenship for which the
community service program was originally designed. The school would argue
that public service programs are not “public forums” in the conventional First
Amendment sense, in which outside groups are permitted to use government
programs or activities for private expression, but rather are adjuncts to the
school’s educational mission, in which private and public groups alike are
tapped to place students for the educational mission of learning the values of
service to the larger community. A hate group whose charter was devoted to
advancing interests in racism, anti-Semitism, or even genocide hardly qualifies
as a worthy repository of the school board’s educational trust, and thus ought to
be legitimately excludable.102

100. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (“We have time and again held that the government generally may not treat people
differently based on the God or gods they worship, or do not worship.”).
101. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality).
102. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 378 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“These fund amental values of
‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular.”).
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VII
CONCLUSION
In our federal system, decisions about school policy are presumptively the
business of state and local governments and the school officials charged with
implementing those policies, and not the business of the federal courts.103 The
political and administrative processes society employs to establish educational
policies should resolve policy debates over the wisdom and utility of community
service programs.104 Community service programs are admittedly not valueneutral. They obviously reflect the community’s philosophical and cultural
judgments about the mission and function of public schools.105 However, if
community service programs are not value-neutral, nothing in the Constitution
requires them to be. Arguments that community service programs constitute
involuntary servitude or amount to deprivations of liberty within the meaning
of our substantive due process tradition are really nothing less than attempts to
transfer decisionmaking from a political to a judicial forum, and should be
rejected. Arguments that community service programs in general violate either
free speech, free association, or free exercise of religion principles are similarly
unpersuasive, largely because most of these programs are sufficiently flexible to
accommodate the needs of virtually any student who might have bona fide First
Amendment objections to some forms of service. It is conceivable, but unlikely,
that a student with sincere, religious scruples against any form of community
service might have a First Amendment right to opt out of such a program, but
such a factual scenario is difficult to imagine. When school officials decide
whether groups should be excluded or included, they must be vigilant against
any slippage into viewpoint-based discrimination, and take care not to exclude
groups that would otherwise qualify as participants solely because of their
religious or political identity. Decisions to exclude a group for ideologically
neutral characteristics, however, raise no serious First Amendment difficulties.
The constitutional prerogative of schools to exclude groups with a mission
directly antithetical to the mission and function of the school is not entirely
clear under existing doctrines. On balance, however, the sounder view should
be that community service programs sponsored by groups with a mission
directly contrary to that of the public schools, such as those with an avowed
dedication to racial genocide, may be excluded from the ambit of participation
without offending the First Amendment.

103. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“This standard is consistent
with our oft-expressed view that the education of the [n]ation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”).
104. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our
[n]ation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene
in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not
directly and sharply implicate constitutional values.”).
105. See generally Salomone, supra note 47.

